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THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN PRIVATE LAW AFTER 
TWENTY YEARS OF DEMOCRACY 
Christopher J. Roederer* 
ABSTRACT 
In The Transformation of South African Private Law after Ten Years of Democracy, 37 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447 (2006), I evaluated the role of private law in consolidating South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. There, I traced the negative effects of apartheid from public 
law to private law, and then to the law of delict, South Africa’s counterpart to tort law. I 
demonstrated that the law of delict failed to develop under apartheid and that the values animating 
the law of delict under apartheid were inconsistent with the values and aspirations of South 
Africa’s democratic transformation. By the end of its first decade, South Africa had made 
considerable progress developing private law, but there was still much work to be done in 
developing the law of delict, and especially contract law. 
This article evaluates South Africa’s second decade of constitutional democracy. While South 
Africa continues to make democratic gains, it also faces serious problems with race, gender, and 
wealth inequality. This article reviews South Africa’s democratic achievements and challenges 
over the last twenty years. It provides a brief overview of private law under apartheid before 
addressing a number of post-apartheid democracy-reinforcing changes to private law. It then 
analyzes the historically conservative common law of contracts and a recent case that progressively 
develops the law of contracts and delict. Next, it turns to the Consumer Act of 2008, which has 
important implications for both contract law and delict. The Act is analyzed in light of two 
contrasting dramatic helicopter crashes: one that occurred before the Act came into effect, and one 
after. While there has been considerable progress, there is still a need for improvement. More can 
be done to align private law with the Constitution’s values, to confront persistent inequality, and 
promote freedom, dignity, and access to justice. Such breakthroughs would also deepen and 
stabilize South Africa’s democracy by bringing democratic principles and values into the everyday 
lives of those affected by private law.
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Rosenheim for their excellent research assistance, as well as my fellow panelists at the Workshop on Twenty Years 
of South African Constitutionalism at New York Law School and my former colleagues at the Florida Coastal School 
of Law, Faculty Scholarship and Development Exchange. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2018 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, I evaluated the role of private law in consolidating democracy in South Africa.1 I 
traced the cancerous effects of apartheid from public law to private law, and then specifically to 
the law of delict, South Africa’s counterpart  to tort law.2 I demonstrated that the law of delict 
failed to develop under apartheid and “that a number of progressive developments that took place 
in the United States during this period did not occur in South Africa.”3 These progressive 
developments generally made it easier for average Americans—particularly consumers and 
employees—to have access to civil justice.4 I argued further that “the values that animated the law 
of delict under apartheid [were] inconsistent with the values, goals, and aspirations of the 
democratic transformation of South Africa.”5 
The South African Interim and Final Constitutions created a number of mechanisms to help 
bring private law in line with the values of a transforming constitutional democracy.6 I concluded 
in my previous work that the democratic “transformation of South Africa helped propel the 
transformation of delict,” and this in turn helped to further consolidate South Africa’s democracy.7 
Nevertheless, at the end of the first decade of South African democracy, there was still much work 
to be done in private law, not only in the law of delict, but also in the law of contracts. This article 
explores the evolution of South Africa’s democracy and private law during its second decade of 
constitutional democracy. 
As in the United States, there is no guarantee that all the social forces will come together to 
strengthen and reinforce democratic values and principles over time. While South Africa continues 
to make democratic gains, the country has also faced setbacks. South Africa continues to face 
serious problems with race, gender, and wealth inequality at all levels of society, including in the 
courts and the legal profession.8 Other setbacks include issues with police conduct9 and serious 
                                                 
1 See Christopher J. Roederer, The Transformation of South African Private Law After Ten Years of Democracy, 37 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447 (2005) [hereinafter Roederer, Ten Years].  
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 453. See also Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. 
Va. L. Rev. 647 (2007–2008) [hereinafter Roederer, Counter-Revolution]. 
4 See generally Roederer, Counter-Revolution, supra note 3. 
5 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 453. 
6 See Christopher J. Roederer, Post-Matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African 
Law, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 57, 69 (2003). Namely, sections 8 and 36 of the Constitution provide such mechanisms. 
Section 8(2) allows for rights in the Bill of Rights to be directly binding on persons in their relations with one another. 
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 8(2). It provides, “[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right.” Id. Section 8(3) further directs a court to give effect to such a right by either developing the common law or 
limiting the common law. Id. § 8(3). It provides, “in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and b. may develop rules of 
the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).” Id. Section 39(2) 
allows a court to interpret and develop all law, including private law, to bring it into conformity with the Bill of Rights. 
It provides: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” Id. § 36(1). 
7 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 453. 
8 Thandiwe Matthews, Of Rainbows and Pots of Gold: Transformation of the Law, Society and the Legal Profession 
in South Africa (Nov. 2014), http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Matthews.pdf. 
9 Carolyn Raphaely, South African Police Accused of Routinely Torturing Crime Suspects, THE GUARDIAN (April 14, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/apr/14/south-africa-police-accused-torture-suspects; Moni Basu, Faith 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2018 
3 
political scandals,10 such as the revival of the apartheid Key Points Act to shield scrutiny over 
lavish improvements to President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandla homestead.11 Similarly, the controversial 
and scandalous Protection of State Information Bill is still in limbo.12 Finally, voter turnout is 
down13 and South Africa’s economic growth, human development growth, and overall happiness 
rates have declined. 
While some may view South Africa as limping along the democratic path, it is useful to view 
South Africa’s progress against the backdrop of America’s historical struggles with race and 
democracy before judging the current state of democracy in South Africa. To be specific, it is 
worth remembering how far the United States had come twenty years after the end of the Civil 
War in 1865. In the first ten years after the Civil War ended, there was real progress with the 
passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which legally gave slaves their 
freedom and citizenship and gave all citizens due process, equal protection, and voting rights.14 
Additionally, within that same decade, Congress passed a number of Reconstruction Acts 
including the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187115 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875.16 However, the 
                                                 
Karimi & Nkepile Mabuse, South Africa Shocked by Police Shootings at Mine, CNN (Aug. 18, 2012) 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/africa/south-africa-mine-violence/index.html; Raf Casert, Badge of 
Dishonour: Death of Taxi Driver Dragged by Van is Latest High-Profile South African Police Scandal, NAT’L POST 
(March 2, 2013), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/03/02/badge-of-dishonour-mans-death-after-being-dragged-by-
van-is-latest-high-profile-south-african-police-scandal/. 
10 Ranjeni Munusamy, A New South African Syndrome - Scandal Fatigue, DAILEY MAVERICK (Jan. 30, 2013) (finding 
scandals have become so commonplace that some claim South Africa is suffering from “scandal fatigue”), 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-01-30-a-new-south-african-syndrome-scandal-fatigue#.VLVhenvl-ac. 
11 The Key Points Act outlaws the release of information or photographs of sites that are considered essential to 
safeguard for national security purposes (e.g., military installations and strategic factories). See National Key Act 102 
of 1980 § 10(2) (S.Afr.). The Department of Works, citing the Key Points Act, denied a request by an investigative 
journalism organization for the release of information surrounding the lavish developments of President Zuma’s 
Nkandla homestead at the taxpayer’s expense. See Phillip De Wet, Nkandlagate: Apartheid law protects Zuma, MAIL 
& GAURDIAN (Nov. 30, 2012), http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-30-00-apartheid-law-protects-zuma; see also Mia 
Lindeque, Calls for ‘Aparthein-Era’ Key Points Act to be Reviewed, EYE WITNESS NEWS (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://ewn.co.za/2014/12/04/National-Key-Points-Acts-of-1980-must-be-reviewed. 
12 See President Refuses to Sign Draconian Bill Into Law, REPORTERS WITHOUT BOARDERS (Sept. 12, 2013) (stating 
that President Zuma refused to sign the Bill into law and sent it back to Parliament in September of 2013), 
http://en.rsf.org/afrique-du-sud-president-refuses-to-sign-12-09-2013,45168.html; National Assembly Approves Info 
Bill, SABC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2013) (finding that the Bill was approved for the third time by the National Assembly in 
November of 2013), http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/8612bb8041cd7c3e8bd9cb5393638296/National-Assembly-
approves-Info-Bill-20131211; Info Bill must go to CC - Sanef, MAIL & GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-05-03-info-bill-must-go-to-constitutional-court-sanef. While there have been calls to have the Bill sent 
to the Constitutional Court, it is unclear what, if anything, is happening with the Bill at present. The South 
African Protection of State Information Bill was drafted to replace the Protection of State Information Act, 1982 which 
regulates the classification, protection, and dissemination of state information. Critics of the Bill argue it does not give 
enough weight to transparency and freedom of expression; it undermines the right to access information; and its 
criminal provisions do not adequately protect whistleblowers and journalists. See, e.g., What’s STILL Wrong With the 
Secrecy Bill?, RIGHT 2 KNOW (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.r2k.org.za/2014/09/11/whats-still-wrong-with-the-
secrecy-bill/. 
13 See infra note 63. 
14 NATHAN NEWMAN & J. J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NYU SCH. OF LAW, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE 
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 9–12 (2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/d/ji5.pdf. 
15 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C § 1985 (1871). 
16 Civil Rights Acts of 1875, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964). 
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Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act in 1883,17 and it would be almost a hundred years 
before similar legislation would be passed again in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 While there was 
a steady increase of African American congressional representatives, peaking at six in 1875,19 that 
number dwindled to two by 1885.20 It was not until 1965, a full century after the Civil War had 
ended, that the number rose above five, and it took until 1969 for it to rise above ten.21 
By comparison, South Africa has done well in staying the democratic course during its first 
twenty years. In addition to early implementation of important public law legislation in the first 
decade, such as the Promotion of Equality and Unfair Discrimination Act of 2001,22 numerous 
democracy-reinforcing gains in private law have made it easier for South Africans to realize their 
private law rights to access the courts and to be made whole when they have been injured or 
harmed. The second decade saw Parliament passing a number of laws that give effect to the 
Constitution’s democratic principles, and case law had taken steps to progressively develop the 
common law in light of the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights. The Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008 (the “Consumer Act”), which provides comprehensive consumer 
protection related to product safety and manufacturers’ liability, contract terms, advertising, 
business practices, and dispute resolution, has been instrumental in the realization of private law 
rights in South Africa.23 Additionally, the Seventeenth Amendment, signed into law in 2013, 
established that the Constitutional Court was the highest court in all matters.24 In 2014, the 
Constitutional Court unanimously brought constitutional values to bear on the law of contracts, 
overturning the Supreme Court of Appeal’s (“SCA”) failure to consider weighty normative and 
constitutional concerns in determining the defendant’s legal duties.25 
Section II of this article briefly identifies the role of equality and opportunity in democracy in 
order to illustrate the importance of private law for South Africa’s democratic future.26 Section III 
reviews some of South Africa’s main democratic achievements over the last twenty years, focusing 
specifically on economic development and voter turnout.27 Section IV provides a brief overview 
of private law under apartheid before reviewing a number of democracy-reinforcing mechanisms 
such as contingency fees, class action suits, and products liability. The section then focuses on the 
law of contracts, the area of private law most resistant to democratic changes over the past twenty 
                                                 
17 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964); Christopher J. Roederer, Working the Common Law Pure: 
Developing the South African Law of Delict (Torts) in Light of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of the South African 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 427, 462–63 (2009) [hereinafter Roederer, Working the 
Common Law Pure]. 
19 COLLEEN J. SHOGAN & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2012 1–5 (2012). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (This was due in large part to the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
22 See, e.g., Employment Equity Act of 1998 (S. Afr.); Promotion of Equality and Unfair Discrimination Act of 2001 
(S. Afr.). 
23 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
24 S. Afr. Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012. 
25 Loureiro and Others v. Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd. 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) ¶ 67 (S. Afr.) (finding a private 
security firm both delicitually and contractually liable for its failure to protect the plaintiffs). 
26 Infra Part II. 
27 Infra Part III. 
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years28 by reviewing the common law of contracts and analyzing a modern progressive case that 
involves contractual and delictual liability. Section V addresses in more detail the most significant 
legislative change in private law since the end of apartheid, namely, the Consumer Act, which 
came into effect in 2011. This section also demonstrates how the Act has important democracy 
reinforcing implications for both contract law and delict, some of which are analyzed in light of 
two contrasting helicopter crash incidents involving spectacular weddings, one from before the 
introduction of the Act and the other from after. 29 Section VI concludes the article. 
I. TRANSITIONING TO A THRIVING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF EQUALITY 
Most of the literature that addresses the transition from a totalitarian or authoritarian regime 
to a “democratic” regime tends to focus on political transformation in public law and not on 
economic transformation that can be effectuated by private law.30 Even after democracy has been 
established and the focus turns to consolidating democracy,31 the bulk of the literature 
predominantly addresses public law mechanisms such as the establishment of the rule of law, 
holding regular and free elections,32 and constitutional change.33 South Africa has done very well 
at transforming its political system; it had amazing turnouts for its first democratic election in 
199434 and made a smooth transition from its Interim Constitution in 1993 to its final Constitution 
in 1996.35 If these changes were sufficient, South Africa would be well on its way to a thriving, 
consolidated democracy by now, but is it?36 
The best revenge for apartheid is for those who were disadvantaged by the regime to be living 
well today.37 This is consistent with the aspirations set out in the Constitution’s preamble, namely, 
to “improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person.”38 While 
                                                 
28 Infra Part IV. 
29 Infra Part V. 
30 See generally SAMUEL P HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(1991); NEIL J. KRITZ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil 
J. Kritz ed., 1995); A. JAMES MCADAMS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (A. 
James McAdams ed., 1997); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (2000); TRICIA D. OLSEN, LEIGH A. PAYNE & 
ANDREW G. REITER, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY (2010). 
31 Consolidating democracy consists of stabilizing, deepening and preventing the erosion or breakdown of democracy. 
32 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 2009, 2013 
(1997).  See also TEITEL, supra note 30, at 5; Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 448. 
33 Other public law mechanisms include criminal punishment, the use of truth and reconciliation commissions, and 
bureaucracy reform. See, e.g., Vision and Mission, ICTJ (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.ictj.org/about/vision-and-
mission. See also Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1. Teitel reviews the rule of law, criminal justice, and constitutional 
justice, which she considers to be the three areas that best reflect the law’s transformative potential. Teitel never delves 
into the private law domain. 
34 See, e.g., Voter Turnout Data for United States, IDEA (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.idea.int/vt/
countryview.cfm?CountryCode=US (voter turnout from those of voting age has significantly diminished since 1994; 
it was higher in 2014 (at 60.03%) than it was in 2004 (56.77%)). 
35 See, e.g., Nur Ibrahim & Tianhao, Building a Nation, HARVARD POLITICS (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/constitution/building-a-nation/. 
36 Cf. Fracois Venter, Liberal Democracy: The Unintended Consequence of South African Constitution-Writing 
Propelled by the Winds of Globalisation, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 45, 59–65 (2010) (arguing that South African 
constitutionalism is under pressure). 
37 Christopher J. Roederer, ‘Living Well is the Best Revenge’—If One Can, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 75 (1999) 
(discussing the difficult task of transforming social and economic institutions). 
38 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
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economic prosperity and human development are not the same as democracy, they are crucial for 
democracy to flourish. We expect that when democracy flourishes, so will the economy, creating 
and distributing more wealth.39 Even though democracy is not expected to deliver total equality, 
gross inequality is inconsistent with a thriving democracy. Gross inequality is a problem for 
democracy when it undermines the ability of people to enjoy political equality and to have fair 
equality of opportunity. 
Political equality is the idea that “[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”40 
According to political philosopher John Rawls, “[t]he fair value of the political liberties ensures 
that citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the 
government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic and 
social class.”41 Equal opportunity is not only important politically, but also socially and 
economically; it is a fundamental principle undergirding free market democracies.42 As Rawl’s 
states, “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are . . . attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”43 This is appealing 
because it is both fair and efficient. If it works, then one gets out of the economic system in 
proportion to what one puts in, and since people have an incentive to do their best, there should be 
more for everyone. 
Capitalist markets alone do not provide fair equality of opportunity. People need a number of 
resources both before they enter the political or economic “market,” and after they have begun to 
participate in those markets. The market is not like a game or sport that merely doles out wins and 
losses, like taking first place in a race. Rather, the market doles out the very things needed for the 
next round of competition. Much like a battle in war, winning becomes harder with more casualties 
and losses, and easier with the infliction of more casualties and the capture of more territory and 
strategic targets. There is not much sport in starting the race or war where one or one's parents left 
off. In order to have fair opportunity, one needs all the basics—health, safety, and education—
before entry into the market. 
If we want everyone contributing to the best of their abilities, then inequalities produced by 
the market need to be harnessed and re-directed to make it possible, and worthwhile, for people to 
put forth their best efforts. While not all advantages and disadvantages can be erased, the fact that 
one’s parents ended the race at the end of the pack should not doom the child to the end of the 
pack. People need basic levels of food, shelter, safety, health and education in order to give them 
a fair chance to contribute and compete in the market.44 The same considerations motivate the need 
                                                 
39 Contrary to the complete laissez faire view, recent work by researchers at the International Monetary Fund indicates 
that “average redistribution, and the associated reduction in inequality, is . . . associated with higher and more durable 
growth. Jonathan Ostry, Andrew Berg, & Charalambos Tsangarides, Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Redistribution, 
Inequality, and Growth (April 2014) (analyzing a recent cross country data set across time that includes both before 
and after tax and transfer inequality). 
40 JOHN RAWL, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971) [hereinafter RAWL, JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWL, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A 
RESTATEMENT 5 (Belknap Press 2001) [hereinafter RAWL, RESTATEMENT]. The argument in the next three paragraphs 
draws on my argument in Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 658–60. 
41 RAWL, RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at 46. 
42 Id. at 302–03 (John Rawl calls this “fair equality of opportunity”). 
43 RAWL, JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 266. 
44 There is a considerable amount of literature on the need for redistribution and delivering on socio-economic rights 
in South Africa. See, e.g., Marius Pieterse, Procedural Relief, Constitutional Citizenship and Socio-economic Rights 
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for private law mechanisms to address the harms people suffer, and to ensure fairness to consumers 
and workers in contracts and employment conditions, so that disadvantages do not become 
crippling and advantages cannot be leveraged beyond what is fair and reasonable. 
As noted above, if the transformation of public law were sufficient to create a thriving 
democracy, one would expect economic development that lived up to the preamble’s aspirations. 
As we shall see, there is still much work to be done to “improve the quality of life” and to “free 
the potential of each person” in South Africa. The next section evaluates the impact of South 
Africa’s democratic achievements by reviewing the state of South Africa’s economic 
development, its levels of inequality, and its overall human development, and considers the role 
that private law can play in further consolidating South Africa’s democracy. 
II. DEMOCRATIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OVER THE LAST TWENTY 
YEARS 
A. Economic Development: Are South Africans Living Well? 
Reports on the progress of economic development in South Africa are mixed. A few reports 
praise South Africa’s economic developments and achievements over the last twenty years, 
particularly the United Nations (“U.N.”) report,45 the Goldman Sachs review,46 and the South 
African government’s report, The 20 Year Review.47 The U.N. reports that “[a]lthough most 
developing countries have done well, a large number of countries have done particularly 
well, . . . notably Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey.”48 It also notes that 
these countries, including South Africa, have excelled in creating substantial export and import 
relationships with more than 100 economies.49 
Other reports, however, are not as positive. Sanlam, a South African financial services group, 
warns that while a 33% increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in South Africa since 
1994 may sound impressive, but it is not impressive when compared with the 115% GDP increase 
produced by other developing countries and emerging markets.50 Sanlam notes, “Brazil, India, 
Indonesia and Turkey, for example, all fared much better than South Africa.”51 Even more 
troubling is the fact that South Africa’s 33% GDP increase did not benefit all South Africans 
equally. 
South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with an Income Gini 
                                                 
as Legitimate Expectations, 28 S. AFR. J. Hᴜᴍ. RᴛS. 359 (2012); SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: 
ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION (2010); DANIE BRAND & CHRISTOF HEYNS, SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (2005). 
45 The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, United Nations Dev. Programme (2013) [hereinafter 
Human Dev. Report 2013]. 
46 Goldman Sachs, Two Decades of Freedom: What South Africa is Doing with It, and What Now Needs to be Done, 
(Nov. 4, 2013),  
47 Twenty Year Review: South Africa 1994–2014, THE PRESIDENCY REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (2014), 
http://www.dpme.gov.za/news/Documents/20%20Year%20Review.pdf. 
48 Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 1. 
49 Id. at 43. 
50 Jac Laubscher, Economic Growth in South Africa: a 20-Year Review, SANLAM (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.sanlam.co.za/mediacentre/media-category/economic-commentary/
Economic%20Growth%20in%20South%20Africa%20-%20a%2020%20Year%20Review. 
51 Id. 
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coefficient of 63.152 and “an unemployment rate of approximately 40%.”53 The only countries that 
are more unequal than South Africa are Namibia, with a Gini coefficient of 63.9, Comoros at 64.3, 
and Seychelles at 65.8.54 Additionally, when considering the respective Human Development 
Indices (HDI),55 South Africa manages to make the United States, the most unequal economically 
developed country in the world with a Gini coefficient of 40.8, look egalitarian.56 
Of 187 countries, the United States’ HDI ranking in 2013 placed it fifth with a “very high 
human development title” (after Norway, Australia, Switzerland and the Netherlands), while South 
Africa ranked 118th.57 From 1990 to 2012, South Africa’s HDI barely improved, moving from a 
mere .621 to .629.58 During the same interval, the United States’ HDI increased from .878 to .937.59 
Brazil managed to increase their HDI from .590 all the way to .730,60 and Turkey’s HDI increased 
from .569 to .722.61 Finally, South Africa’s happiness ranking is at 96 out of 156 countries.62 
B. Impact on Democratic Participation: Voter Turnout at Elections 
While democracy cannot be measured by voter turnout alone, participation in elections is one 
of the most basic and fundamental aspects of democratic participation. Over the last twenty years, 
                                                 
52 See Table 3: Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index, U.N.D.P. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 
[hereinafter Adjusted Human Development Index], http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/IHDI (last visited May 20, 2016). 
53 Id. The Income GINI coefficient “measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption 
expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution . . . a 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.” GINI Index (World Bank 
Estimate), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (last visited May 20, 2016). 
54 Id. (South Africa is more unequal than countries like Mozambique, Angola, Haiti, and Honduras). 
55 The U.N.D.P. Human Development Report defines Human Development Index (“HDI”) as “a composite index 
measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge 
and a decent standard of living.” Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 151. It should be noted that “the HDI 
does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc.” See Human Development Index (HDI), 
U.N.D.P. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (last 
visited May 20, 2016) (providing an explanation of the methods for assessing the HDI’s three dimensions of human 
development). 
56 See Adjusted Human Development Index, supra note 52. One must go down as far as 31 in the HDI rankings before 
one finds another country that is as economically unequal as the United States, and that country is Qatar with a 
comparable Gini coefficient of 41.1. 
57Id. The U.S. inequality adjusted HDI is 0.755 which puts it below Hungary which was ranked 43 in the world with 
an HDI of 0.818 and an inequality adjusted HDI of 0.757. Id. 
58 See Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 149. Note that it increased to 0.663 in 2013 and 0.666 in 2014. See 
Table 2: Trends in the Human Development Index, 1990–2014, U.N.D.P. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 
[hereinafter Trends in Human Development Index], http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends (last visited May 21, 
2016). 
59 Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 148. Note that the U.S. dropped to 0.913 in 2013. Trends in Human 
Development Index, supra note 58. 
60 Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 149. Note that it increased further to 0.752 in 2013. Trends in Human 
Development Index, supra note 58. 
61 Human Dev. Report 2013, supra note 45, at 149. Note that it increased further to 0.759 by 2013. Trends in Human 
Development Index, supra note 58. It should be noted that Brazil and Turkey managed to improve their HDI with less 
inequality than South Africa. Brazil’s Gini coefficient was 54.7 while Turkey’s was 39.0. Human Dev. Report 2013, 
supra note 45, at 153. By 2013 they were 52.7 and 40 respectively. Adjusted Human Development Index, supra note 
52. 
62 United Nations, Sustainable Dev. Solutions Network, World Happiness Report 2013, at 23 (2013), http://unsdsn.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf. 
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South Africa has seen a significant decrease in the percentage of the voting age population (VAP) 
turnout.63 In its first democratic elections in 1994, VAP turnout was at 85.53%. In 2014, VAP 
turnout had dropped to 53.77%.64 
While it is unrealistic to expect South Africans to be able to sustain the same enthusiasm for 
elections that existed at the end of apartheid, the fact that nearly half of the VAP is not participating 
in elections is troubling. Perhaps more troubling is that low voter turnout is associated with the 
inability to close the gap in income inequality.65 If South Africa follows in the footsteps of the 
United States,66 then there will be persistent low voter turnout among certain minorities and those 
with less money and less education.67 
Despite the calls for justice and the numerous small improvements in many areas, large-scale 
redistribution has not and is not likely to take place. Standing in the way is the public law ideal of 
a more liberal, or less authoritarian, regime and the fear of slipping into the status of something 
like Zimbabwe: once a shining example of democratic and economic prosperity that has fallen into 
economic and democratic ruin.68 
South Africa’s ideals, as captured in its Constitution, are egalitarian,69 but its reality is played 
out in an arena with deeply entrenched libertarian ideals that further permeate the global scene in 
which South Africa operates.70 As a result, there is no realistic hope that South Africa will become 
                                                 
63 See Voter Turnout Data for South Africa, IDEA (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=246; 
see also, Collette Schulzherzenberg, Institute for Security Studies, Voter participation in the South African elections 
of 2014 (Aug. 2014), http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief61_Aug14.pdf. 
64 Voter Turnout Data for South Africa, IDEA (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=246. In the 
United States, voter turnout was approximately 57.5 percent in the 2012 election. 2012 Voter Turnout Report, 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/2012-voter-turnout/. 
65 See Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries, 
3 PERSP. ON POL. 449, 459, 462 (2005), https://lanekenworthy.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/2005pop.pdf (“low 
turnout offers a potentially compelling explanation for why the American welfare state has been so much less 
responsive to rising market inequality . . .”). The differences in responsiveness to inequalities roughly tracks voter 
turnout rates. In other words, the higher the voter turnout, the more redistribution from the rich to the poor, and the 
lower the voter turnout, the less redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
66 Inequality has an even larger impact on other forms of democratic participation in the United States. See, e.g., 
Roederer, Counter-Revolution, supra note 3, at 669–74 (citing KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ASS’N, INEQUALITIES OF POLITICAL VOICE (2004)). As I noted in a previous work: “[l]ooking across the spectrum of 
participation, the statistics show that those making over $75,000 per year are between two and six times more likely 
to participate in politics through campaign work, direct contact, protests, affiliation with political organizations, 
informal community activities, and campaign contributions than those making under $75,000 per year.” Roederer, 
supra note 3, at 673. 
67 See id. at 670; see also Alexander Keyssar, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 321 (2001). I have yet to find demographic data on who is registering and turning out to vote in South 
Africa. It does not appear that South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission distributes that data and it is not 
clear if it collects the data. 
68 See Eustinah Tarisavi, Voting in Despair: the Economic & Social Context, in DEFYING THE WINDS OF CHANGE: 
ZIMBABWE’S 2008 ELECTIONS 11–12 (E.V. Masunungure ed., 2008); see also Everson Mushava, Zimbos Turn to God 
as Economic Hardship Worsen, NEWS DAY (June 26, 2015), https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/06/26/zimbos-turn-to-
god-as-economic-hardships-worsen/. 
69 See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 151 (1998); See 
also Christopher J. Roederer, Race Cards, Academic Debate and Progressive Scholarship: What is a Liberal 
Anyway?, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 708 (2001) (arguing not only is the social democratic interpretation a viable competing 
interpretation, it is the “best” interpretation). 
70 See Alfred Crockell, The Hegemony of Contract, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1998) (explaining that the hegemony of 
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a social democratic state, much less a socialist state. South Africa, however, is not likely to 
completely abandon its progressive constitutional aspirations. It is doubtful that South Africa will 
adopt a purely libertarian approach to its public law, and the country has retreated from a libertarian 
approach to private law. The most that can be realistically expected is for South Africa to continue 
taking incremental steps forward in consolidating democracy. This is where private law has an 
important role to play. 
C. The Role of Private Law under Apartheid and in Advancing Democratic Principles 
While it is obvious how sweeping public law changes can bring about radical democratic 
transformation, it is less obvious what effect private law can have on democracy. It is also less 
obvious how private law perpetuated the inequities and injustices of apartheid and how changes 
can help reinforce democracy. Nonetheless, the injustices of the past were not confined to the 
public sphere, but penetrated into almost every aspect of the private sphere. Further, the legacies 
of those injustices continue to exist, in part, because of the way private law is organized.71 
If the problem with apartheid was its authoritarian nature, then it is reasonable to propose 
liberalization as the solution. Liberalization means less government ownership of businesses, less 
government regulation of businesses, less government regulation of people’s private lives, and 
more freedom for businesses and individuals to contract into the relations and obligations of their 
choosing.72 If liberalization were the goal, however, then it would appear that South Africa’s 
private law was not in need of significant transformation in 1994. For instance, under apartheid, 
contract law and delict were already libertarian.73 
South Africa’s constitutional revolution embodies values that significantly outstretch liberal 
democratic values. The Constitution’s values as stated in its Founding provisions include: 
a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms. 
b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.74 
I must reiterate that, “the Constitution mandates that every development of private common 
law must promote the ‘spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.’”75 In addition to provisions 
that grant rights to health, education, and welfare,76 the Constitution also provides that “[a] 
provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the 
right.”77 This open-ended provision allows the courts to determine that, in addition to state actors, 
                                                 
contract law in South Africa “is premised on a deep-level commitment to the primacy of market relations” 
and that “[t]o endorse the hegemony of contract is to take the view that the values of the market deserve to 
triumph over the values of neighbourliness, or of political community”). 
71 See Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 450–51. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. I will defend this view further below. Infra nn. 82–93; see also Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 464–68. 
74 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 1. 
75 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 452 (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(2)); see also Amendment Act 108 of 
1996  
§ 39(2) (S. Afr.) (“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”). 
76 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26-7, 29; Amendment Act 108 of 1996 §§ 26-7, 29 (S. Afr.). 
77 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 452; S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Amendment Act 108 of 1996 § 8(2) (S. Afr.). 
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the Constitution’s provisions bind individuals and corporations. These extensive rights cover not 
only traditional political and civil rights, but also socio-economic and cultural rights that range 
from labor rights to language rights.78 Since 2001, the courts of South Africa have had an 
obligation to harmonize the common law in accordance with constitutional values.79 
Private common law of South Africa did not need to be directly poisoned by apartheid in order 
to exacerbate apartheid’s injustices. On its face, the libertarian private law was neutral.80 On the 
surface, it followed the values of liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law. Freedom of contract 
was treated as more important than social responsibility. For those who were relatively well off 
and equally situated this system made sense. Because they were already free and equal, the system 
worked for them. However, for those less equal, those born into disadvantage, this system 
compounded their disadvantage. While the private law system presumed their freedom and 
equality, the public law political system guaranteed that they would be neither free, nor equal. The 
system also compounded the advantages of those who were privileged as it allowed them to freely 
take advantage of employees and consumers through the law of contract, employment and labor 
law.81 
Employment and labor law under apartheid provides a stark example.82 Black workers were 
excluded from the definition of “employee” under section 1 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 
1956.83 This meant that the informal unions of black workers could not be legally registered and 
any informal collective agreement they may have arranged with an employer was not enforceable 
under the act.84 As noted by Elizabeth Landis, it was unlawful for Black Africans to strike, and the 
punishment under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act was 500 pounds or three years’ 
imprisonment or both.85 As she further observed, it was a criminal offense for Africans to quit or 
fail to carry out an employment contract, or even “to refuse to obey any lawful command, or to 
use any abusive or insulting language toward anyone in authority over him.”86 Under Apartheid, 
the lack of legislation governing workers’ rights combined with laws that governed where black 
                                                 
78 Other rights include substantive equality rights, environmental rights, and the right to food, water, shelter, medical 
attention, education, and culture. 
79 Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 954 A (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Carmichele] 
(holding that “[where] the common law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights the courts 
have an obligation to develop it by removing that deviation.”). 
80 See Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 464 (“Individuals were presumed to be free and equal, and able to determine 
their own legal relationships under the state-enforced law of contracts.”). 
81 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 465–66. Private law under apartheid was similar to classic libertarian contract 
law and the law of torts in the United States before the 1960s. This was the age of buyer beware, assumption of risk, 
and contributory fault in the United States. 
82 See Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 466; see also David Woolfrey, The Application of International Labour 
Norms to South African Law, 12 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 135, 140 (1986–1987); MARTIN BRASSEY, EMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOUR LAW 36 – 42 (1998). 
83 Formerly known as Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 (S. Afr.). 
84 Mpfariseni Budeli, Worker’s Right to Freedom of Association and Trade Unionism in South Africa: An Historical 
Perspective, 15 FUNDAMINA 57, 59, 67–68 (2009). 
85 See Elizabeth S. Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation II: Extension, Enforcement and Perpetuation, 71 YALE 
L.J. 437, 440 (1962) (citing the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act No. 48 of 1953 § 18 (2) (S. Afr.) 
(superseded by Act No. 59 of 1955). 
86 Landis, supra note 85, at 438 (citing Native Labour Regulation Act No. 15 of 1911 (S. Afr.) (amended by Native 
Laws Amendment Act No. 54 of 1952) (punishment of a fine of two pounds or imprisonment for two months with or 
without hard labor)). 
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workers could live, and under what conditions they could be present in urban areas, perpetuated 
racial discrimination in the workplace and made it all but impossible for black workers to compete 
on fair terms in the labor market.87 
All the while, contract law purported to treat everyone as equals—free to contract in, and 
contract away, what few rights they had. The Courts did not require that businesses act in good 
faith when creating labor contracts, and unconscionable contracts were routinely enforced.88 They 
did not create “mechanisms that ma[d]e it more affordable to sue in delict or to make it easier to 
prove a claim in delict.”89 While this formal freedom and equality was beneficial to those with 
“access to information, power, and the ability to cover any losses they may suffer,”90 it was 
detrimental to those who lacked adequate access to information, power and resources. For them, 
it furthered their inequality and limited their freedom. 
During South Africa’s apartheid years, the United States adopted a number of reforms in 
contract and tort law that mitigated some of the inequities that existed in the civil justice system 
of the United States. Contract law in the United States moved from the classical contract model to 
a modern model, and consumer protection laws came in to protect those who were not as free and 
equal as the businesses they were contracting with.91 Most relevant here is that during this era, the 
United States allowed for inequity-mitigating mechanisms such as contingency fees, class action 
lawsuits, and punitive damages and further developed the doctrines of strict liability, products 
liability, and res ipsa loquitur. South Africa did not develop any of these mechanisms during the 
apartheid era but has since made slow but considerable progress. 
III. DEMOCRACY REINFORCING CHANGES TO PRIVATE LAW92 
A. Contingency Fees 
Contingency fees provide a mechanism for plaintiffs without the adequate resources to pay 
for legal fees up front to obtain access to justice. Without them, many low-income plaintiffs are 
denied access to justice.93 However, under apartheid, as in England, there was a common law 
                                                 
87 See Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 466 (black employees could be dismissed for any reason, and “the influx 
of control and residential segregation laws placed black workers at an even further disadvantage in the labor market”). 
On the dismissal of workers, see, e.g., Marylyn Christianson, Incapacity and Disability: A Retrospective and 
Prospective Overview of the Past 25 Years, 25 INDUS. L.J. 879, 879–80 (2004). The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (S. 
Afr.) required that different racial groups live in separate residential and business areas in urban areas. Nonwhites 
were required to live on the outskirts of cities and needed to carry passbooks to justify their presence in white areas, 
including their place of employment. 
88 See generally Lynn Berat, South African Contract Law: The Need for a Concept of Unconscionability, 14 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 507 (1992) (noting that South Africa did not have the concept of unconscionability in contract 
law). 
89 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 467. 
90 Id. 
91 In 1962, President Kennedy ushered in the modern era in consumer protection law in the United States with his call 
for legislation supporting four basic consumer rights: the right to safety, to be informed, to choose, and to be heard. 
See John F. Kennedy, XXXV President of the U.S., 93-Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer 
Interest (March 15, 1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9108. A slew of reform based laws soon 
followed, such as: the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966; the Truth in Lending Act of 1968; the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970; the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1975; and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 
1978. 
92 This section draws on Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 484–96. 
93 Id. at 493. 
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prohibition on contingency fees, and the losing party not only had to pay his or her own legal fees, 
but those of the opposing party.94 Three years into South Africa’s democracy, however, Parliament 
passed the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997.95 The Act now allows for contingency fees in almost 
every area of the law except family law and criminal law.96 This has significantly helped indigent 
South Africans access the justice system.97 
B. Class Actions 
Under apartheid, there were no mechanisms for class action lawsuits. As a result, numerous 
relatively small harms inflicted upon significant numbers of people went un-redressed. As 
previously noted, “[i]n 1998, the South African Law Commission [recommended] legislation 
allowing for class actions and public interest actions in addition to those that are allowed under the 
Constitution for Bill of Rights matters.”98 In 2000, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act authorized class actions for claims related to unfair discrimination, hate 
speech, and harassment.99 The act, however, did not provide similar authorization for the broader 
scope of rights encompassed in the Bill of Rights. Although the Law Commission’s 
recommendations for normal class actions never materialized, Parliament opened the door in the 
Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 in Section 157(1), which provides: 
When, in terms of this Act, an application can be made to, or matter can be brought 
before, a court, the Companies Tribunal, the Panel or the Commission, the right to make 
the application or bring the matter may be exercised by a person . . . (b) acting as a 
member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons, or an association 
acting in the interests of its members; or (c) acting in the public interest, with leave of the 
court.100 
Thus, shareholders could bring a class action against directors and officers of a company for 
violating provisions of the Act, such as section 22, which prohibits reckless trading, section 76, 
which includes fiduciary duties to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, and 
section 77, which includes liability for carrying on business without proper authority; and for 
signing or authorizing false or materially misleading financial statements or participating in the 
                                                 
94 Id. at 494. See Justice Dunstan Mlambo, The Reform of the Costs Regime in South Africa: Part 2, ADVOCATE 22 
(August, 2012), http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2012/august/2012-august-vol025-no2-pp22-33.pdf. Note, that 
the general rule that the losing party must pay the opposing side’s fees still exists, although it has been limited in many 
cases at the discretion of the court, and as Justice Mlambo states, it has reached its sell by date.” Id. at 30; see also 
Jonathan Klaaren, Wits Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Research, The Cost of Justice: Briefing Paper for Public Positions 
Theme Event (24 March 2014), http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/documents/Klaaren%20-
%20Cost%20of%20Justice%20-%20%202014.pdf (noting the continuing problem of the high cost of accessing 
justice in South Africa). 
95 Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (S. Afr.); Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 494. 
96 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 494. Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 § 1(v) (S. Afr.). 
97 Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 § 3(b)(ii) (S. Afr.) (the Act does not remove the loser pay requirement; while the 
contingency fee will make it more affordable to bring a claim with solid merit, if the case is uncertain then a lawyer 
who takes the case risks remaining uncompensated). 
98 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 485; SA Law Commission Report Recognition of Class Actions and Public 
Interest Actions in South African Law §§ 2.1, 32 (Sept. 1998) (S. Afr.). 
99 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 § 20 (S. Afr.). 
100 Companies Act of 2008, § 157(1) (S. Afr.). The Act came into effect in 2011. 
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authorization of a distribution that contravenes the Act.101 
While Parliament had not delineated the parameters of class actions, the SCA took up the 
mantle in 2013.102 In Trustees for the Time Being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust and 
others v Pioneer Food, the SCA held that the recognition of class actions should not be limited to 
constitutional claims, but should be recognized in any other case where that would be the most 
appropriate means of litigating the class members’ claims.103 As the court noted, “it would be 
irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a constitutional right is invoked, 
but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances.”104 
In 2012 over 15,000 ex-gold miners joined together to form the first ever occupational injury 
class action suit against 30 gold mining companies in South Africa for their failure to protect them 
from silica dust that they claim is responsible for their silicosis and tuberculosis.105 Such a lawsuit 
would not have been possible under apartheid, nor even possible during the first decade of 
constitutional democracy. Although the High Court in Johannesburg ruled in 2013 that all the 
pending lawsuits could be combined into one action, the plaintiffs did not close their arguments 
on the certification of the class in the case of Nkala and 60 Others v. Harmony Gold Mining 
Company and 31 Others in the High Court of South Africa until October 14, 2015.106 
C. Manufacturers’ Liability (From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Strict Liability) 
During the first decade of South African democracy, neither the courts nor the legislature were 
willing to impose strict liability on manufacturers for product failures. In Wagener v Pharmacare 
Ltd., Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd., the SCA declined to impose strict liability on a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer for an anesthetic injection that left the plaintiff with paralysis of the right arm.107 
While the Court recognized that the right to bodily integrity108 was “both constitutionally 
entrenched and protected by the common law,” the Court declined to impose strict liability,109 
indicating that it would be more appropriate for the legislature to take that step, and in the 
meantime, the Court could simply take a more liberal approach to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
by invoking the doctrine more often and shifting the onus onto the defendant to rebut the 
presumption of negligence.110 The legislature finally took action with the Consumer Protection 
                                                 
101 Id. § 22. 
102 Trustees for the Time Being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust and Others v. Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd. 2013 
(2) SA 213 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (class action brought by NGOs that work with children, the poor and the disadvantaged 
against bread producers for price fixing practices). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 217–21. The court then laid down the requirements for certifying such an action. 
105 Sarah Evans, Mining Houses Embroiled in Potentially Massive TB and Silicosis Case, MAIL & GUARDIAN (12 Oct. 
2015), http://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-12-mining-houses-embroiled-in-potentially-massive-tb-and-silicosis-case. 
106 Plaintiffs Close Case in Chief in Historic Miner Class Action in South Africa, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6ac46b8a-382f-447f-b6b9-f077d6f4a850. 
107 Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd., Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd. 2003 2 All SA 167 (SCA) (S. Afr.). The injury-causing 
surgery, in which the manufacturer’s anesthetic injection was used, also left the plaintiff with necrosis of the tissues 
and nerves underlying the site of the operation. For a treatment of the case, see also Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 
1 at 490. 
108 Roederer Ten Years, supra note 1, at 490; see also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 12(2). 
109 Roederer Ten Years, supra note 1, at 490 (citing Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd., Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd. 2003 
2 All SA 167 (SCA) (S. Afr.)). 
110 Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd., Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd. 2003 2 All SA 167 (SCA) ¶¶ 14, 19–21 (S. Afr.). 
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Act of 2008, which came into effect in 2011.111 The law introduced strict product liability on the 
manufacturer for the entire supply chain in the event of unsafe goods, product failure, or inadequate 
warnings.112 This groundbreaking piece of legislation will be discussed further in the next section. 
D. The Common Law of Contracts 
As noted, the law of contracts was very slow to change after the end of apartheid. As late as 
2002, the SCA still refused to develop contract law to bring it in line with constitutional values.113 
In both Brisley v. Drotsky114 and Afrox Health Care Bpk v. Strydom,115 the SCA refused to develop 
the law to include a good faith defense to contract law. The Court in Brisley determined that there 
was “no general equitable discretion enabling a court to refuse to enforce a non-variation clause, 
or indeed any other contractual provision, merely on the grounds of it being unreasonable, 
unconscionable or against good faith.”116 The Court in Afrox similarly rejected the argument to 
apply a good faith defense to an exemption of liability provision.117 In Afrox, however, the Court 
left the door open for claims involving “extreme unfairness” which would render a contract 
unenforceable for public policy reasons.118 
At last, in 2014, one finds the Constitutional Court injecting constitutional values into the law 
of contracts. In Loureiro and Others v. Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd., a unanimous 
Constitutional Court overturned the SCA to find a private security firm both contractually and 
delictually liable for the actions of its employee in failing to properly guard the plaintiff and their 
property.119 In Loureiro, the respondent’s security guard allowed criminals, who were 
impersonating police officers, onto the petitioner’s property.120 The High Court of South Africa 
found the company liable to Mr. Loureiro in contract and to Mrs. Loureiro and her two sons in 
delict.121 It found that the security company was negligent because a reasonable security company 
would have foreseen the possibility of criminals attempting to gain entry through the use of 
disguises.122 The High Court determined that there were reasonable steps the respondents could 
have taken to guard against this risk123 and that both the company and the guard on duty failed to 
                                                 
111 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
112 Id. § 61. As the Act states in part: “Except to the extent contemplated in subsection (4), the producer or importer, 
distributor or retailer of any goods is liable for any harm, as described in subsection (5), caused wholly or partly as a 
consequence of—(a) supplying any unsafe goods; (b) a product failure, defect or hazard in any goods; or (c) inadequate 
instructions or warnings provided to the consumer pertaining to any hazard arising from or associated with the use of 
any goods irrespective of whether the harm resulted from any negligence on the part of the producer, importer, 
distributor or retailer, as the case may be.” Id. 
113 See, e.g., Gerhard Lubbe, Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously: The Bill of Rights and Its Implications for the 
Development of Contract Law, 121 S. AFR. L.J. 395, 415 (2004) (addressing the failure of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal to develop the common law in Brisley v. Drotsky 432/2000 ZASCA 35 (S. Afr.) and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v. 
Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
114 See Brisley v. Drotsky 2002 ZASCA 35 (SCA) ¶ 34 (S. Afr.). 
115 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) ¶ 32 (S. Afr.). 
116 Lubbe, supra note 113, at 397 (2004) (citing Brisley v. Drotsky 2002 ZASCA 35 (SCA) at 121 ¶ 12 (S. Afr.)). 
117 Id. 
118 Lubbe, supra note 113, at 398–99 (citing Afrox Healthcare Bpk v. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) ¶ 34 (S. Afr.)). 
119 Loureiro and Others v. Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd. 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
120 Id. ¶ 15. 
121 Id. ¶ 20. 
122 Id. ¶ 18. 
123 Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The security company failed to provide special surveillance and management of the only point of 
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take them.124 The High Court further held that the employer was vicariously liable for the actions 
of the employee.125 
The issue on appeal to the SCA related to how to properly construe an amendment stipulating 
that no one, other than immediate family and a relieving guard, was to be allowed past the gate 
without the authorization of either Mr. or Mrs. Loureiro.126 The issue of law was whether to read 
the amendment as imposing strict liability or a reasonableness standard.127 The SCA held that, 
given the contract as a whole, the clause should be read to contain an implied reasonableness 
standard.128 The SCA further found that the amendment implied an exception for the police to be 
allowed entry on the grounds that the law required allowing police entry.129 Therefore, the SCA 
overturned the High Court and held that the contract had not been breached because it was not 
unreasonable for the guard to have believed that the imposters were police officers.130 On the delict 
claim, the SCA held that the guard had not acted negligently or wrongfully since he acted in good 
faith by providing entry to the police officers.131 
Prior to the August 2013 implementation of the 17th Amendment, which expanded the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to cases raising a matter of general public importance, the 
Constitutional Court would not have jurisdiction to hear the Loureiro case without the presence of 
a constitutional issue.132 Petitioners argued that there was both a constitutional issue133 and that 
the 17th Amendment was applicable.134 Although the 17th Amendment came into effect after 
petitioners’ application to the Court, the Court applied the amendment retroactively on the basis 
that it was procedural and did not affect a party’s substantive rights.135 
Given the public role security companies play in giving effect to fundamental rights, the Court 
found that it was in the interest of justice, and for the benefit of the public, to determine the correct 
                                                 
access, to check the intercom which was the only means of communication from the guardhouse to the home, to give 
its employee clear instructions, and to provide the employee a reliable means to contact his employer. The security 
guard failed to take reasonable and appropriate steps to prevent the anticipated harm when he opened the gate without 
verifying the identity card of the imposters, made no inquires of the imposters, and did not attempt to contact the main 
house for information or permission. Id. 
124 Id. ¶ 18. 
125 Id. ¶ 19. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 12, 21–22. 
127 Id. ¶ 21; see also ¶ 27 for the dissent’s view that the clause was not qualified by a reasonableness standard. 
128 Id. ¶ 21. 
129 Id. ¶ 22. 
130 Id. ¶ 23. 
131 Id. ¶ 24. 
132 See Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) ¶ 31 (S. Afr.) (what counted as a 
constitutional issue was broadly interpreted by the South Africa Constitutional Court). 
133 The applicants argued that there was a constitutional issue regarding the extent to which common law actions in 
contract and delict give effect to the rights to security of the person, privacy, and property. Id. 
134 Id. Before the 17th Amendment, the South Africa Constitutional Court was the highest court of appeals in 
constitutional matters, but the SCA was the highest court in all other matters. There was, therefore, some controversy 
over whether the CC was the highest court of appeals in cases where the courts developed the common law in light of 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights under § 39 of the Constitution. This controversy has now been 
settled courtesy of the 17th Amendment declaring the Constitutional Court as the “highest court in all matters.” S. 
AFR. CONST, 1996. 
135 Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) ¶ 31 (S. Afr.). 
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approach for security companies’ liability.136 To decide the issue of wrongfulness, the Court 
looked to the “norms and values of society, embodied in the Constitution.”137 The Court held that 
the amended clause imposing an obligation not to admit anyone on the grounds without prior 
authorization was not a matter of the guard’s reasonable discretion, but rather a strict obligation.138 
While reasonableness standard is often appropriate for positive obligations, the Court noted that 
negative obligations are more appropriately read as imposing strict liability.139 In light of previous 
breaches by security guards granting the petitioner’s brother unauthorized access, the Court found 
that the reasonableness standard was not appropriate.140 
The finding of wrongfulness was bolstered by public policy and the constitutional rights to 
safety and security as to both person and property.141 The Court held that the proper focus of a 
wrongfulness inquiry was not the guard’s state of mind,142 but rather whether the “policy and legal 
convictions of the community, constitutionally understood, regard[ed] [the conduct as] 
acceptable.”143 Additionally, given that private security companies have assumed the role of crime 
prevention for remuneration,144 there is great public interest in their successfully carrying out their 
functions.145 Therefore, there is an important public interest in not insulating them from delictual 
liability or diminishing their incentive to prevent harm.146 The Court acknowledged that if the 
guard had allowed actual police officers in, it would not have been wrongful,147 but the imposters 
were not actual police officers and the Court reasoned that the community expects security guards 
not to permit imposters onto grounds they are hired to safeguard.148 
This finding of wrongfulness left open the question of negligence. The Court adopted the 
classic test of negligence from Kruger v Coetzee.149 As the Court stated, 
The questions in this case are whether (i) a reasonable person in the position of [the 
security guard] would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring 
another’s person or property and causing loss; (ii) a reasonable person in the position of 
                                                 
136 Id. at ¶ 37. 
137 The South African Constitutional Court spent little time on constitutional considerations. Id. The first paragraph of 
the majority opinion talked about the founding values of the Constitution, a few very relevant rights, the preamble, 
and the duties of the police. There were neither claims that constitutional rights were binding on the private security 
firm under § 8(2) of the Constitution, nor that the law should be developed in light of the spirit, purport, and objects 
of the Bill of Rights under § 39(2). Id. ¶ 35; see Christopher J. Roederer, Working the Common Law, supra note 18, 
at 427–503 (where I describe four mechanisms available for bringing the common law in line with the Constitution). 
138 Carmichele, supra note 135, ¶ 45. 
139 Id. ¶ 45. 
140 Id. ¶ ¶ 43, 45. 
141 Id. ¶ 56. 
142 Id. ¶ 53. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. ¶¶ 2–4. The Court began its opinion noting the very high levels of crime in South Africa. After doing so, it 
noted that private security is one of the largest growing businesses in South Africa and that security companies have 
taken over many of the security and crime control functions that the police at one time exclusively controlled. 
145 Id. ¶ 56. 
146 Id. ¶ 56. 
147 Id. ¶ 54. 
148 Id. ¶ 55. 
149 Kruger v. Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430E-F (S. Afr.). 
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[the security guard] would have taken reasonable steps to guard against that loss; and (iii) 
[the security guard] failed to take those steps.150 
The Court further determined that it was foreseeable that criminals might try to impersonate 
police officers in order to gain entry to the premises and that loss would result.151 The Court noted 
that the extent of the risk of harm and the gravity of the consequences were high while the burden 
of eliminating that risk was slight.152 When the imposters pulled up in an unmarked car with a blue 
flashing light, wearing disguises, all they did was quickly flash an identity card and demand 
entry.153 
The Court held that a reasonable person in the position of the guard would have checked the 
identity card and ensured that those seeking entry were making a lawful demand before allowing 
them entrance.154 Failing that, the guard should have contacted the main house or his employer.155 
As the Court concluded, “[w]hen one is tasked with protecting a property against intruders, it is 
simply not reasonable to open a door for a stranger without adequately verifying who that person 
is or what he or she wants.”156 The Security guard failed to take any reasonable steps to verify the 
identity of the impersonators. 
While there were early developments allowing for contingency fees, it is only recently that 
the law has developed to recognize class actions outside the context of constitutional claims. The 
courts have only recently brought the Constitution’s values to bear on the law contracts and they 
were hesitant to impose strict liability on products manufacturers, preferring to wait for the 
legislature to develop the law in this area. As noted above, the Consumer Protection Act, which 
came into effect in 2011, provides for strict liability for products manufacturers. As will be shown 
below, it has further progressive implications for the law of contracts. 
IV. STATUTORY CHANGES IN CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 
In this section, after a general review of recent changes to consumer protection law under the 
Consumer Act, I apply certain provisions of the Act to two different helicopter crashes involving 
wedding parties: one that took place prior to the Act’s implementation and one after. I also draw 
on a recent High Court case that, even without the aid of the new legislation, is pro-consumer and 
consistent with an analysis under the Act. The review is somewhat speculative because there has 
been no case law interpreting the relevant provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, the cases illustrate 
the potential impact of the Act on fair contractual terms, notice, and access to justice for those 
covered by the provisions of the Act. At the end of the first decade of constitutional democracy, 
“[t]he . . . body of consumer law in South Africa [was] fragmented, outdated, and predicated on 
principles that [were] not applicable in a democratic and developing society.”157 It was not until 
the Department of Trade and Industry commissioned a Consumer Law Benchmark study in 2004 
                                                 
150 Loureiro and Others v. Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd, 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) ¶58 (S. Afr.). 
151 Id. ¶ 61. 
152 Id. ¶ 63. 
153 Id. ¶ 60. 
154 Id. ¶ 61. 
155 Id. ¶ 63. 
156 Id. This was particularly so in this case, given that the guard was experienced, with Grade A qualifications.  
Id. ¶ 64. 
157 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1, at 496. 
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that serious work in the area of consumer law began to take shape.158 In the same year, the 
Department published its Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework, which identified 
numerous consumer protection needs.159 At the end of the first decade of democracy, there were 
“safety standards regarding medicines, foodstuffs and electrical goods,” but there were no safety 
standards for most goods.160 There were also no consumer protection laws for advertising and 
marketing or for contract law.161 
This changed significantly with the introduction of the Consumer Act in 2011.162 These 
notable changes to manufacturers’ liability163 have led to changes to the law regarding clauses that 
attempt to waive or limit the liability of contracting parties, as discussed in the next section. 
A. Wedding Crashes: Applying the Consumer Protection Act to Some Recent Cases 
Two incidents of helicopter crashes that implicate both contract law and delict provide worthy 
examples to illustrate how far South Africa had come in 2004 and how much further it had come 
by 2014.164 The factual scenarios are remarkably similar. Both involved dream weddings in 
beautiful natural venues in South Africa, one at Devil's Peak in the Drakensberg Mountains165 and 
                                                 
158 Botha & Kunene Advisors, S. AFR. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., Consumer Law Benchmark Study (May 2004) (on 
file with author). The Department of Trade and Industry references the study in its Green paper and notes: “A recent 
study conducted by the dti to benchmark the current status of South African general consumer laws against 
international regulatory frameworks, revealed that many countries are moving towards comprehensive legislation for 
consumer protection. Many regions, including Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific have 
developed comprehensive consumer laws that outline upfront the right of consumers. The majority of these laws are 
informed by the UN resolution on Guidelines for consumer protection and Consumers’ International proposed model 
laws for the different regions. South Africa lags behind most developing nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Botswana, Uganda, Malawi etc. who have already adopted a rights-based comprehensive approach to consumer 
protection.” Department of Trade and Industry Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework, GN 1957 of 
GG 26774, at 24 (9 Sept., 2004) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
159 Id. at 25–41.  This included non-misleading marketing and selling practices; adequate disclosure of information; 
fair contract terms; safe products and a better product liability regime; guarantees and warranties for product quality 
and aftercare; respect for their privacy; better access to tribunals for redress (including alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms); and awareness; and education. 
160 Roederer, Ten Years, supra note 1 at 496; see also Green Paper, supra note 158, at 24, 31 (“South Africa lags 
behind most developing nations,” and there are no safety standards for “certain manufactured goods, such as children’s 
clothing”). 
161 Green Paper, supra note 158, at 24. 
162 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). The full range of changes brought about by the Consumer Act are 
beyond the scope of this paper. The numerous purposes of the Act can be found in § 3, which provides: “. . . to promote 
and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers in South Africa by (a) establishing a legal framework for 
the achievement and maintenance of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible 
for the benefit of consumers generally; (b) reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any 
supply of goods or services by [particularly vulnerable] consumers . . . (c) promoting fair business practices; (d) 
protecting consumers from- (i) unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices; 
and (ii) deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct; (e) improving consumer awareness and information and 
encouraging responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour; (f) promoting consumer confidence, 
empowerment, and the development of a culture of consumer responsibility, through individual and group education, 
vigilance, advocacy and activism; (g) providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of consensual 
resolution of disputes arising from consumer transactions; and (h) providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, 
effective and efficient system of redress for consumers.” Id. § 3 
163 See Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
164 These two examples are based on actual incidents, one that took place in 2004, and the other in 2013. 
165 Barbara Cole, Bruised Bride Weds Groom after Chopper Crash, IOL NEWS (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.iol.co.za/
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the other in the Pietermaritzburg Botanical Gardens.166 In both incidents, the wedding parties 
chartered helicopters to bring members of the wedding party to the venue; the helicopters 
crashed.167 
According to an IOL News report on the 2004 crash, the helicopter carried the bride, a 
bridesmaid and her husband, and a photographer.168 All went wrong when the pilot flew the 
helicopter into a cable, which snapped and then got caught up in the rotor blades.169 The report 
states that “the helicopter began spinning and careered straight down the gorge at high speed. Then, 
through some absolute miracle, they spotted a piece of flat land at the bottom of the gorge and the 
pilot managed to lift the helicopter almost horizontally to crash land it in the field.”170 The bride 
reportedly believed that she was going to die, and the helicopter pilots were cited as saying that if 
it were not for the safety provisions of this specific type of helicopter, everyone would have 
perished.171 
Fast-forward nearly a decade and a bride sat in a horse-drawn carriage, along with over 300 
guests, awaiting the grand entrance of the groom.172 As they were waiting, the guests saw the 
helicopter carrying the groom, his parents, and the bride’s brother crash on the road near the 
gardens.173 A bystander was reported as saying, 
I was watching the chopper as it flew over the city. Then it descended and started to 
bank. It sounded like the engine had gone off and it started to spin. It looked as if the 
pilot was trying to put it down in the middle of a large traffic circle. There was a loud 
metallic thump as it hit the road. Then it was flung into the fence. When the dust had 
settled, I ran over and the pilot was lying on the floor. The four passengers were still 
strapped into their seats.174 
Normally, one might expect a range of delict claims to arise out of these two crashes, from 
damage to property, personal injuries, pain and suffering, perhaps loss of earnings, and even 
psychological harm. All of these could be claimed under South African law, even just before the 
end of apartheid, if the defendants were negligent and their negligence wrongfully caused the 
above-mentioned harms to the victims.175 Assuming both negligence176 and causation, these 
crashes appear to present rather straightforward delict cases. The only hurdle is a standard clause 
on the back of the ticket purchased for these flights that tells the passenger that the carrier is not 
                                                 
news/south-africa/bruised-bride-weds-groom-after-chopper-crash-1.226061#.VDftJ00tDGI. 
166 Jeff Wicks, Groom Survives Wedding Crash, IOL News (March 24, 2013), http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/
kwazulu-natal/groom-survives-wedding-crash-1.1490718#.VDfsok0tDGJ. 
167 Although the original wedding plans were ruined, and a few people suffered significant injuries, the good news is 
that no one died and both weddings seemed to eventually went forward. See Cole, supra note 165; Wicks, supra note 
166. 
168 Cole, supra note 165. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Wicks, supra note 166. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., JONATHAN BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICT (1993). 
176 Note that I am not claiming that the helicopter companies in question, nor the pilots, acted negligently. To my 
knowledge, negligence has not been clearly established in either crash. 
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liable for any kind of damage to the passenger caused by the act, omission, neglect, gross neglect, 
or default of the carrier(s), their servants, or agents.177 If this clause is a valid waiver of liability, 
then the harm caused was not wrongful because the victim consented. Until recently, this is how 
such clauses would be viewed; however, recent case law and the Consumer Protection Act change 
the outlook considerably. 
As noted, until very recently, South African law followed the classical libertarian model of 
contract law.178 The recent High Court case of Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel,179 however, illustrates 
that South Africa is moving away from this classical model. Additionally, as will be explained 
below, this area of the law is set to change considerably under the Consumer Act. Although it is 
still unclear how the courts will interpret the Act,180 the provisions of the Act and the recent case 
law make it unlikely that the exemption clause on the back of the ticket would be enforced today, 
whereas this would not have been true for the wedding party in 2004. 
In order for a court to uphold the exemption clause under the Consumer Act, the court would 
need, at a minimum, to find (1) that there was no gross negligence; (2) that the clause was brought 
to the attention of the client “in a conspicuous manner before entering into the transaction, and 
with adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the provision or notice”; and (3) that the 
client “assented to that provision or notice by signing or initialing the provision or otherwise acting 
in a manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk, and acceptance 
of the provision.”181 An additional argument can be made under other provisions of the Act that 
the exemption clause is unenforceable. The analysis in Naidoo further bolsters this argument.182 
The above points and considerations will be explained in detail below. First, I briefly outline 
the law on exemption clauses—also referred to as waiver of liability clauses—as they existed 
before the Consumer Act; second, I discuss how Naidoo creatively interprets and applies the pre-
Consumer Act law; and finally, I analyze how the provisions of the Consumer Act have impacted 
the law. 
Courts have regularly upheld exemption clauses in contracts, even in cases involving adhesion 
                                                 
177 This example of the language found in a standard form exemption clause comes from the back of the ticket 
purchased by the wedding party involved in the 2013 crash, which reads: “Carriage is only accepted at the passengers 
risk and upon the specific condition that the Carrier/s their servant and agents shall be under no liability for any damage 
by air or in connection with the auxiliary services incidental to the carriage by air or whether or not caused or 
occasioned by the act, omission, neglect, gross neglect or omission or default of the Carriers/s their servant or agents. 
The passenger hereby indemnifies the Carriers/s against any claim for compensation for any damage, loss or injury 
whether sustained on board the aircraft or in the course of an of the operation of flight embarking or disembarking 
caused directly or indirectly to him or his belongings which indemnity shall extend to the passenger’s dependents, 
estate or any person whomsoever” (scanned copy of ticket on file with author). 
178 See, e.g., Alfred Crockell, The Hegemony of Contract, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 286, 287–91, 301 (1998). 
179 Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) (S. Afr.) (rejecting the application of a waiver of liability clause 
for a hotel guest who was injured when a negligently maintained gate fell on him because a security guard negligently 
tried to force the gate open). See below for a full treatment of the case. 
180 See, e.g., Afrox Healthcare Bpk v. Strydom 2002 6 (SA) 21 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (upholding a waiver of liability for 
negligence); Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 5 (SA) 323 (CC) (S. Afr.) (upholding a contract clause which barred claims 
made after 90 days). Although § 4 of the Act requires a liberal, pro-consumer approach to interpreting the provisions 
of the Act, South Africa’s judiciary has a record of being conservative in this area. I have not been able to find a case 
that addresses any of the relevant sections of the Consumer Protection Act. 
181 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr). 
182 Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) (S. Afr.). 
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contracts when the fine print is not read.183 Although the SCA in Afrox accepted the idea that a 
contract provision may be unenforceable if it is “surprising or unexpected,” it held that because 
exemption clauses are the rule and not the exception in South Africa, they are not surprising.184 In 
cases of fraud or duress, the clause would not be enforceable and the contract could be rescinded.185 
Additionally, conduct considered contrary to public policy, such as an intentional breach, 
intentional conduct, and fraudulent misrepresentation, could not be excluded through exemption 
clauses.186 
Nevertheless, exclusion of liability for breach of contract, with the exception of non-
performance, was not considered contrary to public policy,187 and neither, as a general rule, was 
the exclusion of negligence.188 Until recently, even liability for gross negligence could be 
waived.189 Section 51(1)(c)(i) of the Consumer Act does not allow for the waiver of liability for 
gross negligence, although it leaves open the question of whether one can exclude liability for the 
negligent causing of death.190 The general rule is that exemption clauses should be construed 
restrictively and that the terms should be unambiguous and clear.191 If a clause is ambiguous, then 
the clause is interpreted against the person relying on the clause.192 
In Naidoo, the High Court refused to enforce an exemption clause because of public policy 
considerations of justice and fairness based on the values of the Constitution.193 The plaintiff in 
Naidoo was injured while exiting the defendant’s hotel when a negligently maintained gate fell on 
him after a security guard tried to force the gate open.194 There was a disclaimer of liability on the 
back of the hotel guest registration card, and although the plaintiff was aware of such disclaimers 
                                                 
183 George v. Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 470 et seq. (S. Afr.) (note that if the term undermines the 
essence of the contract, then that term should be brought to the attention of the party); Mercurius Motors v. Lopez 
2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (case involving an exemption clause from liability for the theft of plaintiff’s car from 
the defendants repair shop exempted from reasonable care in safekeeping the property). 
184 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) ¶¶ 34–36 (S. Afr.). Afrox involved the negligent conduct 
of a nurse at the defendant’s hospital. The patient/plaintiff had signed a document when being admitted to the hospital 
that included an exemption clause. The SCA upheld the clause that exempted the defendant from liability. However, 
the Consumer Protection Act of 2008 severely undermines the precedential authority of this case. See D McQuid-
Mason, Hospital Exclusion Clauses Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice Resulting in Death or Physical or 
Psychological Injury: What is the Effect of the Consumer Protection Act?, 5 S. AFR. J. BIOETHICS & L. 65, 65–68 
(2012). 
185 See Nw. Provincial Gov. & Another v. Tswaing Consulting CC & Others 2007 (4) SA 452 (SCA) ¶ 13(S. Afr.). 
186 Wells v. South African Alumenite Company 2006 (2) SA 365 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Goodman Brothers (Pty) ltd v. 
Rennies Group Ltd. 1997 (4) SA 91 (W) (S. Afr.). 
187 Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd. v. Indus. Machine Suppliers (Pty) Ltd. 1993 (3) SA 424 (AD) (S. Afr.). 
188 Drifters Adventure Tours CC v. Hircock 2007 (1) SA 133 (SCA) at 88 G-H (S. Afr.). 
189 Masstorres (Pty) Ltd. v. Murray & Roberts Constr. (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 654 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Afrox Healthcare 
Ltd. v. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) ¶ 35 (S. Afr.) (the court remarked that liability for gross negligence (medical) 
could possibly be excluded.). 
190 Johannesburg Country Club v. Stott & Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) ¶ 12 (S. Afr.). 
191 Afrox Healthcare Ltd. v. Strvdom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) ¶ 9 (S. Afr.); see also Drifters Adventure Tours CC v. 
Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 (SCA) at 87E (S. Afr.). 
192 Walker v. Redhouse 2007 (3) SA 514 (SCA) ¶ 13 (S. Afr.) (upholding a clause that excluded liability for “any loss 
or damage . . . sustained as a result of . . . injury to my person . . . in the course of my horse-riding about the property 
of Walkersons” in a case where a horse bolted, causing injuries to the rider/plaintiff). 
193 Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) (S. Afr.). 
194 Id. at 170, ¶ 2. 
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in general, he claimed not to have read the one on the back of this particular card.195 The bottom 
of the front of the card he signed stated, “[p]lease read terms and conditions on reverse!”196 Clause 
5 of 7 on the back read, in pertinent part, 
The guest hereby agrees on behalf of himself and the members of his party that it is 
a condition of his/her occupation of the Hotel that the Hotel shall not be responsible for 
any injury to, or death of, any person . . . caused or arising from the negligence (gross or 
otherwise) or wrongful acts of any person in the employment of the Hotel.197 
The Court applied the general rule regarding strict construction of exemption clauses in favor 
of the consumer. Nevertheless, the Court found that the notice on the front of the registration card 
was clearly visible, and the exemption clause on the back was straightforward in absolving the 
defendant from liability.198 The Court further acknowledged that even if the plaintiff did not read 
the disclaimer, the plaintiff conceded that he should have been reasonably aware of the disclaimer 
and its contents.199 
The Naidoo court still found for the plaintiff. The Court distinguished the two leading SCA 
cases of Durban’s Water Wonderland200 and Afrox on two grounds: (1) the facts of each case arose 
prior to the Constitution201 and (2) the activities in those cases—amusement park rides and surgical 
operations—are inherently risky while being a guest in a hotel is not.202 The Court also 
distinguished the Constitutional Court’s 2007 decision in Barkhuizen v. Napier, which upheld a 
contract clause that barred plaintiff’s claims made after ninety days,203 because there was “scant” 
evidence in that case.204 
The Court did, however, apply Barkhuizen’s analysis to determine whether a contractual 
provision was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid.205 The test laid down in Barkhuizen 
asks whether the clause afforded a party a reasonable and fair opportunity to approach a court. 
Barkhuizen held that a clause could either be inherently unreasonable, and thus invalid on its face, 
or unreasonable as applied in a given set of circumstances, and thus unenforceable.206 Naidoo 
quoted from Barkhuizen that: “[p]ublic policy imports the notions of fairness, justice and 
reasonableness and would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term if its enforcement would 
result in an injustice.”207 
                                                 
195 Id. at 177–78, ¶¶ 34–38. 
196 Id. at 178, ¶ 36. 
197 Id. at 178, ¶ 37. 
198 Id. at 179, ¶ 42. A court would also likely find the ticket’s notice and disclaimer in the helicopter case to be equally 
clear and straightforward. 
199 Id. at 179, ¶ 42. This fact is distinguishable. The plaintiff in Naidoo was a driver who had considerable exposure 
to Hotels and their disclaimers of liability. 
200 Id. at 180, ¶ 45. 
201 Id. ¶ 46. It is not clear that this distinction would be convincing to other courts, given that Afrox addressed the 
constitutional public policy considerations and still held that contractual autonomy was paramount. 
202 Id. ¶ 45. Of course, this second point does not aid in the case of helicopter ride. 
203 Id. at 180, ¶ 48. 
204 Id. ¶ 49. 
205 Id. ¶ 52. 
206 Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
207 Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) ¶ 53 (S. Afr.) (citing Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) ¶ 73 (S. Afr.)). 
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The Naidoo court did not rest its decision on any given provision in the Bill of Rights but 
rather looked at the legal principle of public policy in light of the new constitution.208 Naidoo 
referred to the SCA’s observation in Brisley that: 
[I]t was not difficult to envisage a case where certain contracts offend against the 
new social compact that the Constitution embodies. Decisions that proclaim that limits 
of contractual sanctity lie at the borders of public policy would receive enhanced force 
and clarity in the light of the Constitution and the values embodied in the Bill of Rights.209 
The court in Naidoo further drew on the Constitutional Court’s decision in Barkhuizen, quoting 
Ngcobo J for the proposition that: 
[P]ublic policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it represents those 
values that are held most dear by the society. Determining the content of public policy 
was once fraught with difficulties. That is no longer the case. Since the advent of our 
constitutional democracy, public policy is now rooted in the values of our Constitution 
and the values that underlie it . . . human dignity, equality and freedom . . . as given 
expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . . Thus a term in a contract that is 
inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, 
therefore, unenforceable.210 
With respect to the issue of access to the courts for judicial redress, Naidoo noted that the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen “gave a clear indication that a term in a contract that seeks to 
deprive a party of judicial redress is prima facie contrary to public policy and is inimical to the 
values enshrined in our Constitution, even if freely and voluntarily entered into by consenting 
parties.”211 Although the court in Naidoo did not hold that such clauses are inherently 
unreasonable,212 it did hold that the clause it was examining should not be upheld because it 
unfairly and unjustly limited the plaintiff’s right to a judicial remedy. The Court stated: 
A guest in a hotel does not take his life in his hands when he exits through the hotel 
gates. To deny him judicial redress for injuries he suffered in doing so, which came about 
as a result of the negligent conduct of the hotel, offends against notions of justice and 
fairness.213 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this reasoning would invalidate most waivers of liability for 
the negligent conduct of public accommodations, for the same could be said of restaurants, 
theatres, and even amusement parks. 
                                                 
208 Naidoo relied on the constitutionally inspired view of public policy adopted by the Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen. Id. ¶ 47. Barkhuizen actually referred directly to § 34 of the Constitution which guarantees the right of 
access to court, namely, “Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.” Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) ¶ 5 (S. Afr.). 
209 Naidoo v. Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) ¶ 46 (S. Afr.) (citing Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) ¶ 92 (S. Afr.)). 
210 Id. ¶ 47 (quoting Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) ¶ ¶ 28–29 (S. Afr.)). 
211 Id. ¶ 50. 
212 Id. ¶¶ 52-3. The Court claimed that neither this issue, nor the constitutionality of such clauses, were properly raised 
before the Court. In dicta, the Court noted that it did not believe that clauses exempting liability for bodily injury or 
death caused negligently would pass constitutional muster. 
213 Id. ¶ 53. 
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As noted above, the Consumer Act has changed many of the rules in this area. Relevant 
changes include notice requirements, signature or initialing requirements, the categorical invalidity 
of certain types of exemption clauses, and general provisions that may render certain clauses 
invalid. These changes are consistent with and reinforce the constitutional values of substantive 
equality, dignity, and true freedom214 as opposed to the presumed formal equality and freedom of 
contract that existed under apartheid.215 They help protect those who are less equal from being 
exploited by unfair terms of which they may not be aware, may not fully understand, or to which 
they may not consent. They further the Constitution’s section 34 right to judicial redress by 
creating and preserving rights that would have been abrogated by the “freedom” of contract. 
Section 49(1) of the Act requires that consumers be given notice of certain terms and 
conditions, particularly exemption clauses: 
Any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that purports to—
(a) limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person; . . . must be 
drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the formal 
requirements of subsections (3) to (5).216 
Subsections 3–5 require that the provision be written in plain language and that it be brought to 
the consumer’s attention in a conspicuous manner before entering into the transaction and with 
adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the provision or notice.217 
Subsection 2 further requires that in cases where the “notice concerns any activity or facility 
that is subject to any risk . . . (c) that could result in serious injury or death,” that the supplier draw 
this to the consumer’s attention.218 Not only must the supplier notify the consumer of the nature 
and potential effect of the risk, but the consumer must affirmatively assent to the provision by 
“signing or initialing the provision or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision” for the 
waiver to be valid.219 
Section 51(1)(c)(i) forbids making an agreement subject to terms or conditions that “limit or 
exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability for any loss directly or indirectly attributable 
to the gross negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier.”220 
Among other things, Section 51 also forbids a supplier from making a 
                                                 
214 Section 1(a) of the South African Constitution lists “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms” as its first set of “Founding Values.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 1(a). The 
Constitutional Court stated that the founding values have an important place in the Constitution as they both “inform 
the interpretation of the Constitution and other law, and set positive standards with which all law must comply to be 
valid.” United Democratic Movement v. The President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) ¶ 19 (S. 
Afr.). Furthermore, § 1 of the Constitution is the most entrenched provision. The provision can only be amended by a 
bill passed by at least 75 percent of the members of the National Assembly and by six provinces from the National 
Council of Provinces. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 1; Amendment Act 108 of 1996 § 74 (1). 
215 See, e.g., Catherine Albertyn, Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa, 23 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 
253, 253–76 (2007). 
216 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 49(1) (S. Afr.). 
217 Id. § 49(3)–(5). 
218 Id. § 49(2). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. § 51(1). Supplier is defined in the Act as: “a person who markets any goods or services.” Id. Chapter 1. 
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[T]ransaction or agreement subject to any term or condition if— (a) its general 
purpose or effect is to— (i) defeat the purposes and policy of this Act; . . . (b) it directly 
or indirectly purports to— (i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; 
(ii) avoid a supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of this Act;221 (iii) set aside or override 
the effect of any provision of this Act; or (iv) authorize the supplier to— (aa) do anything 
that is unlawful in terms of this Act; or (bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms 
of this Act . . . . 222 
Arguably, clauses that exempt liability for negligence violate both subsections (a) and (b) of 
Section 51. Given that only gross negligence was categorically excluded, however, it may be 
difficult to convince a judge that clauses that have been upheld under the common law for years 
as being consistent with public policy are now contrary to public policy under the Act.223 
The relevant general provisions governing the rights of consumers and the duties of 
suppliers224 require the terms and conditions to be fair, reasonable, and just.225 Article 48(2) 
provides further that such a term or condition is unfair, unreasonable, or unjust if: 
[I]t is excessively one-sided . . . (b) the terms . . . are so adverse to the consumer as 
to be inequitable; (c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation . . . to the detriment of the consumer; or (d) the transaction or agreement 
was subject to a term or condition, or a notice to a consumer contemplated in section 
49(1), and (i) the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
unconscionable; or (ii) the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not 
drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the applicable 
requirements of section 49.226 
Thus, terms can be unfair when they are one sided and inequitably adverse, and when there is 
a lack of notice or awareness or there have been false or misleading representations with regards 
to the terms or provisions. 
Assuming that the wedding parties did not sign or initial the waiver and did not act in a way 
that a court would find indicated acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk, and 
acceptance of the provision, then the clause should not be enforceable. However, even if a court 
were to find that such awareness and acceptance existed—like in the case of Naidoo—both the 
court’s reasoning in Naidoo and the general provisions of the Act indicate that the provision would 
likely be found unfair, unreasonable, and unjust because it is one-sided, and the terms are likely to 
be seen so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable. 
                                                 
221 Id. Section 22 requires information to be proved in plain language. Id. § 22. 
222 Id. Among the many purposes of the Act listed in § 3 is (d) protecting consumers from—(i) unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices; and (ii) deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent 
conduct. Id. § 3. 
223 See, e.g., Kevin Hopkins, The Enforceability of Exemption Clauses: Are They In Line with Constitutional Values?, 
465 DE REBUS, June 2007, at 24. Many thought that § 39 of the Constitution would change the way courts viewed 
exemption clauses. The Afrox case is strong evidence that the South African Judiciary is not easily swayed. See D 
Bhana & M Pieterse, Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited, 
123 S. AFR. L.J. 865 (2006). The Naidoo case is an exception. 
224 See generally Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.) The Act contains numerous provisions that provide 
rights and duties that are not likely relevant to the helicopter crashes and case law under review in this article. 
225 Id. § 48(1). 
226 Id. § 48(2). 
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CONCLUSION: WHICH WAY FORWARD? 
At the end of twenty years, there is considerable evidence of democracy-reinforcing changes 
to the private law of contracts and delict. By the end of the first decade, there were significant 
achievements regarding rights and equality-based claims and progress in the law of delict, but 
there was much work yet to be done. The second decade solidified the Constitutional Court’s role 
in insuring that all laws in South Africa are interpreted and developed in harmony with the spirit, 
purport, and objects of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and Constitution as a whole. There has also 
been significant democracy-reinforcing progress in contract law by virtue of both case law and 
legislation. 
Despite these significant developments, one may still be left feeling unsatisfied with the 
overall inequality and lack of development in South Africa, and with only minor progress in the 
economic development of the South African people as a whole. There is an expression in South 
Africa that “[t]he fundamental premise in law is that damage (harm) rests where it falls, that is, 
each person must bear the damage he suffers.” 227 At most, what one should get out of the law of 
delict is restitutio ad integrum—to be put back in the same situation they would have been in but 
for the delict. Thus, if you were poor or had little earnings before, then you remain poor, and if 
you were rich before, you remain rich. These principles remain despite the numerous developments 
making it easier to bring, and win, a claim when one is harmed. 
At its base, private law in general, and the law of delict in particular, remain conservative 
when it comes to distributive justice. It is not surprising that the Constitutional Court judges 
residing in Johannesburg have sympathy for the plaintiffs in their suit against the security firm in 
Louriero, and while the wedding cases are somewhat dramatic, they all ended reasonably well for 
the likely very well-off parties. Everyone likely had insurance, received excellent medical 
attention, and had relatively minimal disruptions to their careers and enjoyment of life. The courts 
simply do not consider the economic status of the parties and do not consider redistribution a 
proper aim of private law. The notion that distributive justice is not one of the aims of delict is so 
entrenched that one will find almost no mention of it in either case law or in the academic 
literature.228 
Nevertheless, there is always space within the South African legal framework for progressive 
developments in this direction. In the words of Justice Ngcobo from the Constitutional Court: 
South Africa is a country in transition. It is a transition from a society based on 
inequality to one based on equality. This transition was introduced by the interim 
Constitution, which was designed ‘to create a new order based on equality in which there 
is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens should be 
able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms’. This commitment to 
the transformation of our society was affirmed and reinforced in 1997, when the 
Constitution came into force. The Preamble to the Constitution ‘recognises the injustices 
of our past’ and makes a commitment to establishing ‘a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental rights’. This society is to be built on the foundation 
of the values entrenched in the very first provision of the Constitution. These values 
                                                 
227 J. Neethling et al., LAW OF DELICT 3 (J.C. Knoble trans. & ed., 4th ed. 2001) (referencing J.C. Van der Walt & J.R. 
Midgley, DELICT: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 19 (1997)). 
228 One notable exception is the work of Dennis M. Davis & Karl Klare, Transformative Constitutionalism and the 
Common and Customary Law, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 403 (2010). 
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include human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms. 229 
Article 39(2) of the South African Constitution provides that “[w]hen interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”230 Given the egalitarian and 
transformative nature of that spirit,231 and the fact that existing principles have regressive 
effects,232 there is hope that commentators will pay more attention to, and that courts will take into 
consideration, the distributive effects of private law. 
While private law reform is no panacea for all that ails South Africa’s democracy, it is one 
very important element in the consolidation of democracy. Private law can exacerbate inequality, 
diminish dignity, limit freedom, and close off avenues for redress when people are harmed, or it 
can embrace the Constitution’s values, confront persistent inequality, and promote freedom, 
dignity, equality, and access to justice. Doing so not only promotes the values of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy, as the text itself implores, but it also helps deepen and stabilize South 
Africa’s democracy by bringing those transformative democratic principles and values down from 
public law and into the lives of those affected by private law. The harmonization of the 
Constitution’s democratic values is important, not just symbolically. Harmonization will translate 
values into private law rights, remedies, and a more accessible justice system that will help make 
victims whole, restore their dignity, and promote their actual freedom and equality. Although there 
is more work to be done, the private law of South Africa has been on a steady, if somewhat slow, 
track to a more harmonious relationship with South Africa’s transformative constitutional 
revolution and towards freeing the potential of its people. 
                                                 
229 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others, 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
¶ 73 (S. Afr.). It should be noted that the list of those that the Constitution’s equality provision extends well beyond 
race and gender. § 9(3) includes: “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996; 
Amendment Act 108 of 1996 § 9 (S. Afr.). 
230 S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Amendment Act 108 of 1996 § 39(2) (S. Afr.). 
231 See, e.g., Roederer, Working the Common Law, supra note 18, at 427–503; Dennis M. Davis & Karl Klare, 
Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law (2010) 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 403, 411 
(Dennis Davis and Karl Klare argue that “ ‘[d]evelopment of the common law’ pursuant to § 39 is not about tinkering 
or consistency – it connotes a long-term project of fashioning common law foundations for a just and egalitarian 
society”). 
232 See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 67–69 (2007) (arguing that tort 
law principles of compensation are regressive in that they impose more risks on the poor, undercompensate the poor, 
result in regressive cross subsidies in liability insurance and ignore the greater impact on the poor due to ignoring 
diminishing marginal utility). 
